2026-506 cryptocurrency seizuresDisclosure log response · North Wales Police
2026-506 cryptocurrency seizures.pdf
Read it at North Wales Police's website
- Published
- 4 Jun 2026
- Published by
- North Wales Police
- Outcome
- Refused
- Exemptions
- Section 24 National security
- Section 31 Law enforcement
- Source
- North Wales Police's website
- Recorded by PoliceFOI
- 2 Sept 2026
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Uned Rhyddid Gwybodaeth / Freedom of Information Unit
Pencadlys yr Heddlu,
Glan-y-Don, Bae Colwyn LL29 8AW
www.heddlugogleddcymru.police.ukPolice Headquarters,
Glan-y-Don, Colwyn Bay LL29 8AW
www.northwales.police.ukResponse Date:04/06/2026
2026/506 - Cryptocurrency seizures
In response to your recent request for information regarding;
- Details of all cryptocurrency seizures made in each of the last 48 months.
- Details of the date, size and type (which cryptocurrency) of each seizure.Harm has been identified in providing you with the information requested.
We can confirm information relevant to your request is held. However, this information is being
substantively withheld under Section 24(1) and 31 (1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
These are qualified, prejudiced based exemptions, and we have therefore considered the harm in
providing the information along with a public interest test.
Section 24 (1) National Security Section
Section 31(1)(a) & (b) Law Enforcement
Disclosure of detailed information relating to cryptocurrency seizures, including seizure-by-seizure
data, specific dates, values or the type of cryptocurrency seized, would be likely to cause real and
significant harm. Cryptocurrency seizures are typically the outcome of intelligence-led
investigations into serious and organised crime, including fraud, cyber-enabled crime and drug
supply, and in some cases activity linked to terrorism. Releasing granular information would reveal
operational patterns, investigative focus and enforcement capability.Organised crime groups are known to actively monitor publicly available information to assess law
enforcement risk. Disclosure of individual seizure dates or values would allow offenders to link
enforcement activity to known arrests, platform closures or other public events. This would enable
them to adapt their behaviour by altering the timing of transactions, moving assets more quickly or
changing methods to reduce the likelihood of detection, thereby prejudicing the prevention and
detection of crime.Disclosure of the specific types of cryptocurrency seized would further increase this harm. Different
cryptocurrencies offer varying levels of anonymity and traceability. Revealing which types are
successfully seized would indicate where police capability is strongest or weakest, enabling
criminals to migrate to alternatives perceived as less detectable. This would undermine the
effectiveness of asset seizure powers and future investigations.From a national security perspective, cryptocurrencies are known to be used to move funds across
borders outside traditional financial systems. Detailed seizure information would provide insight
into the extent to which UK policing is able to disrupt these methods. This could assist hostile orterrorist actors to assess UK capability and adapt their financial practices to avoid detection,
reducing the effectiveness of measures designed to protect public safety.The harm arising from disclosure would be real rather than hypothetical and would prejudice law
enforcement activity and pose a risk to national security.Public Interest Test – Section 31(1)
Factors favouring disclosure
There is a public interest in transparency and accountability in policing, including providing
reassurance that police forces take action against the criminal use of cryptocurrency. Disclosure of
information can contribute to public understanding of how law enforcement powers are exercised.Factors favouring maintaining the exemption
There is a strong public interest in ensuring that police forces are able to prevent and detect crime
effectively. Disclosure of detailed or granular seizure information would undermine operational
effectiveness by revealing investigative patterns, capability and focus. This would assist criminal
actors to evade detection and adapt their behaviour, directly reducing the effectiveness of law
enforcement activity.Public Interest Test – Section 24(1)
Factors favouring disclosure
There is a general public interest in openness regarding how public authorities address threats
linked to serious crime and emerging technologies.Factors favouring maintaining the exemption
There is a very strong public interest in protecting national security and public safety. Disclosure
that assists hostile or terrorist actors to understand, assess or counter UK policing capability would
be contrary to the public interest. The potential consequences of such harm would be serious and
far-reaching.Balance
While transparency is an important principle, it is adequately met through the provision of
high-level, aggregated information where appropriate. The additional insight gained from disclosure
of seizure-level detail, specific dates or cryptocurrency types is limited and is substantially
outweighed by the risk of prejudice to law enforcement and national security.The balance of the public interest therefore favours maintaining the exemptions under sections
31(1) and 24(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.Therefore, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this letter acts as a Refusal
Notice under section 17 (1) of the legislation.THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST
UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000, AND IS CORRECT AS AT01/06/2026
© North Wales Police. Reproduced for non-commercial purposes from https://www.northwales.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/north-wales/disclosure-2026/2026-506-cryptocurrency-seizures.pdf under North Wales Police's publication scheme terms, which allow free reproduction if accurate and not misleading, with the source and copyright acknowledged. The text only, as read from the published documents; material owned by others is not covered. Collected on 2 September 2026; North Wales Police may have changed or withdrawn it since.
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