FOI 22854 Covert IntelligenceDisclosure log response · Staffordshire Police
FOI 22854 Covert Intelligence
Read it at Staffordshire Police's website
- Published
- 29 May 2026
- Published by
- Staffordshire Police
- Outcome
- Neither confirmed nor denied
- Exemptions
- Section 21 Already reasonably accessible, for example published elsewhere
- Section 23 Supplied by, or about, the security bodies
- Section 24 National security
- Section 30 Investigations and proceedings
- Section 38 Health and safety
- Section 40 Personal information
- Source
- Staffordshire Police's website
- Recorded by PoliceFOI
- 2 Sept 2026
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The original
The text of this file
29 May 2026 FOI Ref 22854
Request - You asked Staffordshire Police (SP) the following:
1. What is the total amount spent by the force on Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) over the last
five financial years? (Please break this down for each year from 2021/2022 up until 2025/2026)
2. For each of those periods, please could you list the number of individuals who have received a payment
that is categorised as one made to a CHIS?SP received your request on 08/05/2026 and have processed this under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).SP’s response to your enquiry is as follows:
SP holds the requested information.
• 1. What is the total amount spent by the force on Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) over
the last five financial years? (Please break this down for each year from 2021/2022 up until
2025/2026) – Partially disclosed, please see the accompanying file entitled ‘FOI 22854 Covert
Intelligence Data’. With regards to any further information SP can neither confirm nor deny
under sections 23(5), 24(2) and 30(3). Please see the below. The data for the years 2021/2022
to 2024/2025 has been withheld, please see section 21 below.• 2. For each of those periods, please could you list the number of individuals who have received a
payment that is categorised as one made to a CHIS? – Withhheld, please see the below
exemptions under sections 30(2), 38(1) and 40(2).The following exemptions have been applied:
In accordance with Section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, this letter represents a refusal notice
for parts of this request.• Section 21(1) - Information reasonably accessible by other means.
Section 21 is an absolute, class -based exemption and as such there is no requirement to quantify the
harm that may arise from the disclosure, nor is there a requirement to perform a Public Interest Test.• Section 38 (1) (a) (b) – Health and Safety
Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to (a) endanger
the physical or mental health of any individual, or (b) endanger the safety of any individual. This exemption
is qualified and prejudice -based and, as such, we are required to evidence the harm in disclosure and
apply the public interest test.• Section 40(2) Personal Information
Section 40(2) is an absolute exemption which means that there is no need to quantify the harm that may
arise from the disclosure; neither is it subject to a public interest test.To release personal or third -party information held by SP, would breach the data protection principles;
namely –• Data is lawfully and fairly processed.
• Processed in line with an individual’s rights.
• Data is secure.Personal and third-party information cannot be released under the Freedom of Information Act.
Disclosure under Freedom of Information is a release of information to the world in general and not an
individual applicant.• Section 30(2)(b):
relates to obtaining information from confidential sourcesSP can neither confirm nor deny whether any further information relevant to this request is held,
as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of
the following exemptions:• Section 23(5): Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption.
Confirming or denying whether any additional CHIS related information is held would reveal information
supplied by, or relating to, bodies listed in section 23(3). The Act therefore prohibits confirmation or denial.• Section 24(2): Section 24 is a prejudice-based exemption.
To confirm or deny the existence of further information would undermine national security by damaging
the confidence of CHIS who assist the police and by enabling hostile individuals to draw inferences about
the level or nature of covert activity in a forc e area. This prejudice would arise even where no national
security related CHIS are in use.• Section 30(3): Section 30 is a class based qualified exemption.
Confirming or denying whether additional information is held would provide insight into policing’s covert
capabilities, allowing offenders to adjust behaviour to avoid detection and undermining investigative and
intelligence gathering functions.Public Interest Test
Harm - Section 24
Confirming or denying the existence of any additional CHIS related information would risk undermining
national security by damaging the recruitment, retention and confidence of individuals who assist law
enforcement as covert sources. Even the perception that CHIS related information might be inferred from
FOI responses can cause reluctance to engage with the police. Confirming or denying whether further
material exists would allow individuals, hostile groups or organised criminals to infer whether covert activity
is, or is not, taking place in a particular force area. These inferences could then be used to adapt behaviour
to evade detection, identify covert tactics, or target individuals suspected of involvement in covert
intelligence. This would compromise national security and threaten public safety.Harm - Section 30(2)(b)
There is longstanding public knowledge that police forces use covert human intelligence sources to assist
investigations. Disclosure of the requested information could, in principle, increase public understanding
of how intelligence is gathered, how inform ants contribute to daily policing operations, and how this
supports the prevention and detection of crime. Transparency may also help correct misconceptions about
the use and management of CHIS and allow the public to consider whether such financial or ope rational
arrangements are appropriate.However, disclosure of the number of CHIS or the number receiving payment could reveal patterns of
covert activity within the force area. Over time, the release of such information would allow individuals to
analyse peaks or troughs in CHIS use and draw co nclusions about operational priorities or investigative
intensity. This would undermine intelligence gathering, hinder the prevention and detection of crime, and
prejudice the force’s ability to maintain confidential sources. It may also expose individuals , or those
suspected of being CHIS, to the risk of harm. Disclosure would damage the confidence of those assisting
law enforcement and would impede the force’s ability to recruit and retain CHIS in future. While the public
has a legitimate interest in tran sparency around policing, the ability of the police to protect the public,
gather intelligence and maintain covert capabilities is of far greater weight. Disclosure that undermines
CHIS confidence or reveals operational patterns would jeopardise those essential functions. The balance
therefore lies firmly in favour of non disclosure.Harm (Section 38)
Releasing the highest single annual CHIS payment, even as a standalone figure, could enable individuals
to draw inferences about covert activity and potentially identify or suspect someone of being a CHIS. This
creates a real risk of intimidation or physical harm to those involved and undermines the safety measures
designed to protect sources, staff, and the public.Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial (Sections 24 and 30)
There is a public interest in demonstrating that policing is transparent about its use of public funds and its
management of covert capabilities. Confirming or denying the existence of further information could help
the public understand high-level structures around how CHIS are used and may support informed public
debate about the appropriateness and proportionality of covert policing tactics. Public awareness of
policing processes can contribute to confidence in the accountability of law enforcement.Factors Against Confirmation or Denial (Sections 24 and 30)
However, confirming or denying whether additional CHIS-related material exists would reveal whether the
force holds covert information of a sensitive nature, enabling individuals to infer operational capability,
levels of covert activity, or the presence or absence of CHIS within the force area. Such inferences could
be used by offenders or hostile groups to avoid detection, frustrate investigations, or exploit perceived
gaps in covert coverage. Confirmation or denial would also undermine the confidence of existing or
potential CHIS by suggesting their involvement could be indirectly exposed. This would damage
intelligence-gathering and hinder the prevention and detection of crime. In addition, any suggestion of
covert arrangements in a specific area could place individuals at risk of harm.Factors favouring disclosure under Section 38(1)(a)(b)
Disclosure would promote transparency around public spending and support public confidence that CHIS
payments are monitored and used appropriately.Factors favouring non-disclosure under Section 38(1)(a)(b)
CHIS-related information is kept confidential to protect the safety of those who assist police covertly.
Release of the highest payment could allow individuals to speculate about CHIS involvement, placing them
at increased risk of harm. Protecting life and safety outweighs the public interest in disclosure.Balance Test (Sections 24, 30 and 38)
Although transparency supports accountability and public confidence, the risks associated with confirming
or denying the existence of further CHIS -related information are substantial. Disclosure would prejudice
national security by undermining covert capabilities, discouraging CHIS cooperation, and enabling hostile
actors to exploit operational sensitivities. The public interest in protecting covert operations, safeguarding
individuals and maintaining the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing outweighs the arguments in favour
of confirmation or denial. The partial NCND under sections 23(5), 24(2), 30(3) and withheld section 38(1)
is therefore upheld.Please be advised that all F reedom of Information request responses are published on the SP website
although personal details are not included.Advice and assistance
In order to comply with our obligations under Section 16 of the Act, the obligation to provide advice and
assistance, please find below links to the information requested.• Published items - 22594 | Staffordshire Police
Freedom of Information Request Appeals Procedure
1. Who Can Ask for a Review
Any person who has requested information from SP, which has been dealt with under the Freedom of
Information Act, is entitled to complain and request an internal review, if they are dissatisfied with the
response they received.2. How to Request a Review
Requests for review of a Freedom of Information request must be made in writing within two months of the
date of receipt of this email, and should be addressed to:[removed by PoliceFOI]
Or by Post to:
Information Access Team
Staffordshire Police HQ
PO Box 3167
Stafford
ST16 9JZThe reference number, date of the request and details of why the review is being requested must be
included. Requests for review should be brought to the attention of the Information Access Team within
two months of the Force’s response to the original FOI request.3. Review Procedure
Receipt of a request for review will be acknowledged in writing. The review will be conducted by a
Supervisor who is independent from the original Decision Maker. The Information Access Team will set a
target date for a response. The response will be made as soon as is practicable with the intention to
complete the review within 20 working days. In more complex cases the review may take up to 40 working
days.The independent Supervisor will conduct a review of the handling of the request for information and of
decisions taken, including decisions taken about where the public interest lies in respect of exempt
information where applicable. The review enables a r e-evaluation of the case, taking into account the
matters raised by the complaint.4. Conclusion of the Appeal
On completion of the review the Independent Supervisor will reply to the appellant with the result of the
review. If the appellant is still dissatisfied following the review they should contact the Information
Commissioner to make an appeal. The Information Commissioner can be contacted via the following link:
https://ico.org.uk/make-a-complaint/foi-and-eir-complaints/foi-and-eir-complaints/Freedom of Information
Information Access Team
© Staffordshire Police. Reproduced for non-commercial purposes from https://www.staffordshire.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/foi-media/staffordshire/2026-published-foi-requests/may/foi-22854-covert-intelligence.pdf under Staffordshire Police's publication scheme terms, which allow free reproduction if accurate and not misleading, with the source and copyright acknowledged. The text only, as read from the published documents; material owned by others is not covered. Collected on 2 September 2026; Staffordshire Police may have changed or withdrawn it since.
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