PoliceFOIby Assize Data

PoliceFOI is an independent record of what police forces and the justice system are asked under the Freedom of Information Act, and what they publish. It is not the police: to report a crime, call 999 in an emergency or 101.

FOI 95/25 Data Breaches and SAR'sDisclosure log response · Cleveland Police

Data Breaches and SAR's

Read it at Cleveland Police's website

Published
12 Aug 2025
Published by
Cleveland Police
Outcome
Neither confirmed nor denied
Exemptions
Source
Cleveland Police's website
Recorded by PoliceFOI
2 Sept 2026

We read the outcome and the exemptions automatically from the response's own words, so this can be wrong: report a mistake. What the outcomes and codes mean.

In full, as Cleveland Police published it

We show a record in full only where its publisher's terms allow it. Most police forces in England and Wales publish under the same publication scheme terms: anyone may reproduce a force's own material free of charge if it is accurate and not misleading and the source and copyright are acknowledged, but not for any commercial purpose. PoliceFOI is published by a company, so we treat our use as commercial, and for those forces we show each record's title and summary, with a link to the original, until the force agrees to more. A few forces' terms are stricter still. None of these terms covers material owned by someone else, or a force's logo, so we link to such material rather than copy it.

FOI 95/25 Data Breaches and SAR's

Enquiry Reference: FOI 95-25

I write in connection with regards to your Freedom of Information request. Below is your request and our response.

  1. Can I have your records about sales of personal data from 2023 (01.01.2023) to 2024 (31.12.2024), including trading partners and money earned from transactions?
  2. a) No information held.
  1. Do you use tracking cookies on your website, and can I have a list of third parties that you share personal data with?
  2. a) No information held; we subscribe to the Single Online Home run by the MPS.
  1. Have you received any complaints about how you handle personal data? This includes collecting, storing, sharing or selling, as well as wider processing practices.
  2. a) Complaints are a subtype of personal data breaches therefore see answer to question 5.

Please can I view records about these complaints for 2023 and 2024?

Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon, Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act requires that I provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) state (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

Cleveland Police can confirm it holds any other information pertinent to this request as the duty in Section 1(1) (a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemption:

Section 40(2) Personal Information

Section 40(2) is an absolute exemption which does not require me to evidence the harm that disclosure would cause and does not require consideration of a public interest test in justification of its use.

On this occasion the information requested is clearly personal information and contravene the first principle of the General Data Protection Regulation 2018 (GDPR) - Article 5(1) requires that personal data shall be: (a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to individuals (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’), what are the likely expectations of the data subjects, in that would they expect Cleveland Police to release to the world the record of the data breaches they have complained about since release of information under The Freedom of Information Act 2000, is a release to the world at large and not just to the individual applicant and as such I believe to do so would amount to unfair processing and hence therefore is exempt under Sections 40.

In accordance with Section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this notification acts as a Refusal Notice to this section of your request.

  1. How many subject access requests did you receive in the period 2023-2024, broken down by year?
  2. a)

2023 – 440

2024 – 546

What types of personal data did they typically receive? For example email addresses, home addresses and telephone numbers?

  1. a) This will depend on what contact the data subject has had with Cleveland Police.
  1. How many data breaches have you experienced for the past 5 years (broken down by each year)?
  2. a) See below figures regarding personal data breaches we only hold the information from 2021 as how we hold/record them changed.

2024 – 86

2023 – 76

2022 – 81

2021 – 37

Above is all the information we will disclose for anything else we will rely on the following:

Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon, Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act requires that I provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) state (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

The Cleveland Police Service can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to your request as the duty in s1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) National Security.

Section 30(3) Investigations.

Section 31(3) Law enforcement.

Sections 24, and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or not that the information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Section 30 is a qualified class-based exemption and there is a requirement to conduct a public interest test.

Harm in Confirming or Denying that Information is held

To confirm or deny whether any further information is held in respect of successful cyber-attacks resulting in Data Breaches would provide actual knowledge that where an attempt has been made, it has or has not been successful. Confirming that such information is not held may assist potential attackers by indicating that an attack had gone undetected. Equally, confirming information is held would enable understanding of where attacks have been successful, and possible weaknesses exist. Attackers may then be able to tailor their methods to increase their chances of success.

To confirm or deny whether information is held in respect of any leaked data as a result of an attack would, in effect, confirm that there had been successful cyber-attacks made against the force, which would present harm as detailed above.

Furthermore, in order to counter criminal and terrorist behaviour it is vital that the police and other agencies have the ability to work together, where necessary covertly, in order to obtain intelligence within current legislative frameworks to ensure the arrest and prosecution of offenders who commit or plan to commit acts of terrorism, whereby their modus operandi may involve cyber-attacks on secure databases. In order to achieve this goal, it is vitally important that information sharing takes place with other police forces and security bodies within the United Kingdom in order to support counter-terrorism measures in the fight to deprive terrorist networks of their ability to commit crime. To confirm or deny specific details of any breaches of information technology and security would be extremely useful to those involved in terrorist activity as it would enable them to map vulnerable information security databases.

Public Interest Considerations

Section 24(2) National Security

Factors in favour of confirming or denying that information is held

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and how resources are distributed within an area of policing. To confirm information is held regarding successful cyber-attacks causing Data Breaches would enable the general public to hold the police to account ensuring all such breaches are recorded and investigated appropriately. With the call for transparency of public spending this would enable improved public debate.

Factors against confirming or denying that information is held

Security measures are put in place to protect the community we serve. As evidenced within the harm to confirm whether any cyber-attacks have been successful would highlight to terrorists and individuals’ intent on carrying out criminal activity vulnerabilities within the police which could be further exploited.

Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information (such as the citing of an exemption which confirms information pertinent to this request is held, or conversely, stating ‘no information is held’) which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity.

Irrespective of what information is or isn’t held, the public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.

The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would be even more impactive when linked to other information gathered from various sources about terrorism. The more information disclosed over time will give a more detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of not only a force area but also the country as a whole.

Any incident that results from such a disclosure would, by default, affect National Security.

Section 31 – Law Enforcement

Factors favouring confirming or denying that information is held

Confirmation that information exists relevant to this request would lead to a better informed public which may encourage individuals to provide intelligence in order to reduce such security breaches.

Factors against confirming nor denying that information is held.

Confirmation or denial that information is held in this case would suggest the police take their responsibility to protect information and information systems from unauthorised access, destruction, etc., dismissively and inappropriately.

Balancing Test

The points above highlight the merits of confirming or denying the requested information exists. The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. As part of that policing purpose, information is gathered which can be highly sensitive relating to high profile investigative activity. Weakening the mechanisms used to monitor any type of criminal activity, and specifically terrorist activity would place the security of the country at an increased level of danger.

In addition anything that places that confidence at risk, no matter how generic, would undermine any trust or confidence individuals have in the Police Service. Therefore, at this moment in time, it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test favours neither confirming nor denying that information is held.

If you are not satisfied with this response or any actions taken in dealing with your request, you have the right to request an independent internal review of your case under our review procedure. The Freedom of Information Code of Practice (see below link) states that a request for internal review should be made within 20 working days of the date on this response or 40 working days if extenuating circumstances to account for the delay can be evidenced. Public authorities are not obliged to accept internal reviews after this date.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-of-information-code-of-practice

Yours sincerely

Information Rights Decision Maker

© Cleveland Police. Reproduced for non-commercial purposes from https://www.cleveland.police.uk/foi-ai/cleveland-police/disclosure/2025/january/foi-9525-data-breaches-and-sars/ under Cleveland Police's publication scheme terms, which allow free reproduction if accurate and not misleading, with the source and copyright acknowledged. The text only, as read from the published documents; material owned by others is not covered. Collected on 2 September 2026; Cleveland Police may have changed or withdrawn it since.

If this text names you or you own part of it, ask us to take the full text down: it is hidden as soon as you send the form, and the title and summary stay.

Cleveland Police in figures

80,074 crimes recorded in the 12 months to Sept 2026; 5,788 stop and searches in the 12 months to Apr 2026. Figures from data.police.uk.

More about Cleveland Police

Ask us to remove a name from this page (free) · Report a mistake